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Abstract: Using micro-data from the 2004 ‘Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in 
Europe’ (SHARE), this study investigates the division of household labor in older couples 
(aged 50+) in a cross-national perspective. Across ten continental European countries, we 
find considerable variation in the overall distribution of housework between partners. One 
may roughly distinguish between more egalitarian countries in northern Europe and more 
traditional countries in the southern parts of Europe. A multivariate analysis shows that the 
observed spatial pattern is neither due to differences in population composition, nor due to 
country-specific effects of individual characteristics. We do find a significant effect of 
macro-level gender inequalities on couples’ division of housework, though. In addition, our 
analysis suggests the presence of relevant further, though unobserved contextual effects. 
The paper concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
Keywords: gender; division of household labor, older couples, Europe, SHARE 
 
                                                 
? Mannheim Research Institute for the Economics of Aging, University of Mannheim. Direct all 
correspondence to: Karsten Hank, MEA – University of Mannheim, Building L 13-17, D-68131 
Mannheim, Germany. Phone: +49-621-181-3439. Fax: +49-621-181-1863. Email: hank@mea.uni-
mannheim.de. 
 1
Introduction 
Research on ‚productive aging’ is growing rapidly (cf. O’Reilly & Caro 1994; Morrow-
Howell et al. 2001). Most of the related literature deals with involvement of the elderly in 
volunteering (e.g., Caro & Bass 1995; Erlinghagen & Hank 2005), grandparenting (e.g., 
Pebley & Rudkin 1999; Vandell et al. 2003) or other work usually performed for parties 
outside the individual’s household. However, work performed within one’s own household 
also has a substantial economic value. Without home production, one would have to buy 
substantially more household services on the market (cf. Stoller & Cutler 1993; Hank 2001, 
for example). While gender differences in other types of unpaid or informal work are also 
recognized (e.g., Herzog & Morgan 1992), they are particularly pronounced in the division 
of housework between spouses. Despite some changes across cohorts, with more recently 
born women doing less and their male partners doing somewhat more (both relative and 
total), men generally contribute at most one third of ‘core’ housework tasks until today 
(e.g., Bianchi et al. 2000; Breen & Cooke 2005; Shelton & John 1996). 
Several studies dealing with post-retirement changes in couples’ division of 
household labor show that the total amount of housework done may increase after 
retirement for both men and women, but that the traditional pre-retirement pattern largely 
persists (e.g., Dorfman 1992; Solomon et al. 2004; Szinovacz 2000). So far, however, the 
division of household labor in older couples has not been analyzed in a cross-national 
perspective. Recent investigations for the general population strongly suggest that macro-
level factors, particularly gender inequalities, play a significant role for the distribution of 
housework between spouses (e.g., Breen & Cooke 2005; Davis & Greenstein 2004; Fuwa 
2004). Using data on couples aged 50 and older, derived from the new ‘Survey of Health, 
Ageing and Retirement in Europe’, the present paper investigates the relationship between 
societal context and the division of routine household labor in ten continental European 
countries. Before we present our empirical analysis, we will briefly review the linkage 
between micro- and macro-level aspects of ‘gender’ and housework. 
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Gender and the division of housework 
Various economic models play a prominent role in much of the literature on household 
labor. While the new home economics’ approach, put forward by Becker (1981), proposes 
that men and women specialize in order to maximize household utility or efficiency, the 
resource-bargaining power perspective focuses on power relations in the family (based on, 
for example, educational or income differentials between the partners), and the economic 
dependency model is centered around the assumption that women are ‘forced’ to exchange 
household labor in return for economic support from a male breadwinner (cf. Brines 1993; 
Greenstein 2000, for example). These theories are compatible with general formulations of 
the relative resource hypothesis (a person with higher income will do less housework) and 
the time availability hypothesis (a person who spends more time in paid work will spend 
less time in housework), “which are putatively gender neutral, emphasize choice, and 
assume that housework allocation is governed by the rules and principles of exchange 
relations” (Coltrane 2000: 1214; see also Shelton & John 1993: 304ff.). 
However, it has been suggested that “women’s employment, time availability, 
resources, conscious ideology, and power do not account for why wives still do the bulk of 
family work” (Thompson & Walker 1989: 857) regardless of demographic or life-course 
characteristics. The partners’ gender appears to be so influential that it is often considered 
to be the single most important determinant of the division of household labor. Theories on 
socialization-gender role attitudes, for example, contend that people socialized to believe 
in gender segregated work will conform to those beliefs (e.g., Coverman 1985; Thompson 
1993). Thus, men and women with ‘traditional’ attitudes are expected to share less 
housework, whereas men and women with ‘nontraditional’ attitudes are expected to share 
housework more equally. It is assumed that people are ‘automatically’ socialized into rigid 
gender roles from childhood onwards, going along with the development of relatively fixed 
attitudes and/or deeply gendered personalities. These strict assumptions are rejected by 
more recent gender construction theories that incorporate the symbolic and performance 
dimensions of gender (cf. Shelton & John 1993: 312). “Doing specific household tasks 
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provides opportunities to demonstrate to oneself and to others that one is a competent 
member of a sex category with the capacity and desire to perform appropriately gendered 
behaviors” (Coltrane 2000: 1213). Thus, housework does not only produce household 
commodities, but also gendered identities throughout the life-course. 
Gender ideology determines what a proper gender role is. Just as gender ideologies 
vary across individuals (e.g., Greenstein 1996), the social construction of gender is highly 
context dependent and varies across nations or cultures, for example. Mason (1997: 158) 
defines the societal gender system as “the socially constructed expectations for male and 
female behaviour that are found (in variable form) in every human society. A gender 
system’s expectations prescribe a division of labour and responsibilities between women 
and men and grant different rights and obligations to them.” Resulting macro-level gender 
inequalities – that may be promoted or ameliorated by the welfare state (Orloff 1996; see 
also Geist 2005) – materialize in various spheres (cf. Huber 1990), such as the educational 
system (e.g., Jacobs 1996), the labor market (e.g., Chang 2000), or the political arena (e.g., 
Elder 2004). Naturally, they are also reflected in spouses’ division of work in the family 
(e.g., Sarkisian & Gerstel 2004; Sundström & Duvander 2002; Thompson & Walker 1989) 
and in the household. Thus, Coltrane (2000: 1208) suggests that the almost universally 
observed pattern of household labor “can only be understood by attending to the symbolic 
significance of household labor in the social construction of gender and by analyzing the 
social, cultural, economic, and political contexts in which men and women form families, 
raise children, and sustain households.” 
Starting from Baxter’s (1997) five-country study – covering the United States, 
Sweden, Norway, Canada, and Australia – a number of studies have explicitly investigated 
the division of housework in advanced industrialized societies from a cross-national 
perspective (for an analysis of less developed countries see, for example, Sanchez 1993; 
1994). A universal finding is that wives’ contribution to household chores is still greater 
than their husbands’, even in the most egalitarian countries (e.g., Davis & Greenstein 
2004). More differentiated insights can be derived from recent work using multilevel 
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modeling. Batalova & Cohen (2002), for example, who focus on the role of premarital 
cohabitation, can show that national cohabitation rates in countries with higher levels of 
overall gender equality have equalizing effects on couples’ division of housework 
regardless of their own cohabitation experience. Fuwa (2004) elaborates on the role of 
macro-level gender inequalities, arguing that “male control over the political economy and 
male dominated ideologies at the macro-level may act as ‘discount factors’ against the 
power of individual women’s resources” (p.752; see also Blumberg 1984). Thus, she 
expects that individual-level factors will have weaker effects on the division of household 
labor for women who live in countries with less pronounced gender equality – and vice 
versa. Using the same data source (the 1994 International Social Survey Programme; ISSP) 
and selection of 22 countries on which the study by Batalova & Cohen (2002) is based, 
Fuwa (2004) indeed finds that women living in less-egalitarian countries benefit less from 
their individual assets in the negotiation over housework. This is supported by an analysis 
of a subset of countries participating in the ISSP, which shows that equal sharing of 
household tasks is particularly rare in countries with a conservative welfare state regime, 
independent of the partners’ relative resources, time availability, or gender ideology (Geist 
2005). 
To our knowledge, though, no cross-national research has been carried out yet that 
pays particular attention to the gendered division of household labor in older couples. 
Filling in this gap for continental Europe, our study complements recent time-use research 
pointing to significant inter-gender and inter-country differences in time-use patterns at 
older ages (cf. Croda & Gonzalez-Chapela 2005; Gauthier & Smeeding 2003). It also adds 
a European perspective to the so far almost exclusively U.S. centered literature on the 
division of housework in later life, particularly after retirement. And finally, it investigates 
possible interactions between couple characteristics and the household’s country of 
residence in determining patterns of household labor.  
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Method 
Data 
The data for our study are drawn from the first public release version of the 2004 ‘Survey 
of Health, Aging and Retirement in Europe’ (SHARE; see http://www.share-project.org for 
more information). SHARE is modeled closely after the U.S. ‘Health and Retirement 
Study’ (HRS) and it is the first European data set to combine extensive cross-national 
information on socio-economics status, health, and family relationships of the elderly 
population (see Börsch-Supan et al. 2005). The data contain information on some 22,000 
individuals aged 50 or older from 15,000 households in ten countries, representing 
Europe’s economic, social, institutional, and cultural diversity from Scandinavia to the 
Mediterranean (Sweden, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, 
Austria, Italy, Spain, and Greece – further data are currently being collected in Belgium and 
Israel). Probability samples have been drawn in each participating country; the average 
household response rate in the face-to-face part of the survey is 55 %, ranging from 38 % in 
Switzerland to 69 % in France (a thorough description of methodological issues is 
contained in Börsch-Supan & Jürges 2005). Our analytic sample was restricted (a) to 
respondents living in a marital or non-marital union at the time of the interview and (b) to 
couples where at least one partner filled out the survey’s self-completion questionnaire 
(which includes the question on which our dependent variable is based). This results in a 
total of 4,391 observations (see Table 1 for details). 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Variables 
This paper deals with ‘routine housework’ (Coltrane 2000: 1210). The construction of the 
dependent variable modifies Davis & Greenstein’s (2004) measure, taking advantage of the 
fact that SHARE provides both partners’ assessment of who takes the primary 
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responsibility for routine household chores. This is a major improvement over existing data 
sets such as the ISSP. The (generic) English version of the SHARE questionnaire asks 
“Who in the couple takes or took the main responsibility for cooking, cleaning the house, 
laundry and ironing?” with five answer categories: ‘myself only’, ‘myself mainly’, myself 
and my partner equally’, ‘my partner mainly’, ‘my partner only’ (coded 1 through 5). Since 
this question was asked to both partners, responses were recoded in order to distinguish 
‘husbands’ from ‘wives’. To account for possible discrepancies in spouses’ responses (cf. 
Kamo 2000; Lee & Waite 2005), we use the mean of their respective answers, ranging from 
1 (both partners agree that the wife does all housework) to 5 (both partners agree that the 
husband does all housework).1 Values larger than 3, which indicate that the male partner 
does the main share or even all of the housework, are observed for less than two percent of 
our sample. 
On the right-hand side of the regression, we use a set of ‘standard’ micro-level 
control variables including the partners’ age, education, (gross) income, employment 
status, and health, as well as information on the partners’ marital status and family 
responsibilities. These variables shall cover those dimensions that previous studies have 
shown to be relevant for the distribution of housework between spouses – such as relative 
resources, time-availability, and (to a lesser degree) gender ideology – but which are not the 
primary focus of this study. Our main concern is the role of societal factors for older 
couples’ division of household labor. Following Batalova & Cohen (2002) as well as Fuwa 
(2004), we use the United Nations’ Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM; see UNDP 
2004) as a core measure of macro-level gender inequalities. GEM is an index based on the 
percentage of parliamentary seats held by women, the percentage of female administrators 
and managers, the percentage of professional and technical workers who are women, and 
women’s share of earnings income. It ranges from 0 to 1, where higher scores represent 
greater levels of empowerment for women. Since GEM is not available for France, 
however, we alternatively utilize for all SHARE countries two of its elements, the 
                                                 
1 In 95 percent of our observations, both partners report the same or a neighboring answer category. 
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percentage of parliamentary seats held by women and the female-male wage ratio, as 
indicators of gender inequalities. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics. 
Analytical strategy 
Since our dependent variable is derived from a set of ordered responses, ordered logit 
models are used in the analyses. We follow a stepwise procedure (see Table 2): Model 1 
contains only couple characteristics, pooled across all countries, to which we add – in 
Model 2 – a dummy variable that distinguishes the five countries with the highest 
proportions of older couples sharing housework equally from the remaining five countries 
(see below). In Model 3, our set of explanatory variables is supplemented by the percentage 
of females in the parliament and the female-male-wage ratio. Model 4 uses GEM as an 
indicator of gender inequalities, which implies that France is excluded here. Finally, using 
the same variables as in Model 3, separate regressions for countries with lower and higher 
proportions of couples sharing housework equally are run in Model 5 and Model 6, 
respectively.2 
 
Empirical findings 
Before we present our multivariate results, we will briefly discuss some main descriptive 
findings, displayed in Figure 1. First, there is an obvious north-south divide in the gender 
division of labor in the SHARE countries. This is reflected in the distribution of the 
proportion of couples where the partners share household tasks equally (including cases 
where the husband does more). While, for example, in Greece and Spain less than 10 
percent of couples aged 50 and older exhibit an equal division of labor in the household, 
this is the case in about 17 percent of Dutch, German, and Swedish couples. The top rank is 
held by the Danes, where one out of four couples shares core household tasks equally. 
                                                 
2 An alternative to our strategy of estimating separate regressions would have been to estimate a 
random coefficient model, for example. In recent years, this kind of multilevel modeling has 
become quite popular in social science research (cf. Teachman & Crowder, 2002, for example). 
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Second, there is strong indication for a close relationship between the division of 
household labor in older couples and macro-level measures of gender inequalities. Plotting 
the proportion of couples with an equal division of housework against the proportion of 
female members of parliament, against a country’s female-male wage ratio, and (excluding 
France) against GEM reveals a clear positive association. The five countries with the 
highest proportions (15+ percent) of older couples sharing housework equally – France, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, and Denmark – are also the ones with the highest 
proportions of female members of parliament (30+ percent), the highest female-male wage 
ratios (50+ percent), and the highest scores of GEM (.8 or more). A noteworthy outlier is 
France, with a fairly equal gender division of housework but a low percentage of 
parliamentary seats held by women. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
We now turn to the multivariate analysis (see Table 2; note that positive coefficients 
indicate a larger share of the male partner in total housework). As expected, older couples 
(i.e. those with a higher mean age) exhibit a more traditional pattern of housework, as do 
those with a higher age difference between the partners. The respective coefficient, which is 
statistically significant in Model 1, becomes insignificant in subsequent models, though. 
Both, male and female higher education, which is likely to be positively correlated with less 
traditional gender ideologies, contributes to a more gender equal division of housework 
(e.g., Coltrane 2000: 1221). Household income has a non-linear effect on men’s 
participation in household tasks: we find that the contribution of the male partner is lowest 
in the households with the lowest and highest income quintiles. The effect of relative 
income is asymmetric: men with a lower income than their (female) partner tend to do 
somewhat more housework than those having about the same income as their partner 
(where equal income is defined as being in the same income quintile), but the difference is 
not statistically significant (cf. Bittman et al. 2003). However, if the wife earns less than her 
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husband, the husband’s share in household duties is significantly lower than in couples with 
about equal income. 
The number of children and men’s participation in the labor force also decrease 
males’ participation in household chores. If, however, the female partner engages in paid 
work her husband’s share of household labor increases. The same holds if the woman has 
retired, which – at first glance – might seem to be a surprising result, contradicting findings 
of previous studies (e.g., Szinovacs 2000). In our model, however, the reference category 
consists of women who are neither gainfully employed nor retired. Since these are mostly 
housewives, retirement in our model is an indicator of women’s previous labor force 
participation, which is likely to facilitate a somewhat more equal division of housework 
between the partners even after retirement (assuming continuity in household roles; e.g., 
Dorfman 1992: 163f.).3 Male retirement tends to be negatively correlated with the 
dependent variable, but significantly so only in Model 1. 
Limitations by health problems are not significant, if they affect men, but they do 
result in a stronger engagement of the husband in household duties, if the female partner’s 
health is limited. Living in a non-marital union, which is said to go hand in hand with less 
traditional gender ideologies, strongly increases men’s participation in housework (see 
Batalova & Cohen 2002; South & Spitze 1994). Family obligations have an effect on older 
couples division of household labor in the sense that men caring for parents (and/or 
grandchildren) also take larger responsibilities within their own household. If the female 
partner helps the parent generation, which has been shown to reduce women’s paid work 
hours (e.g., Spiess & Schneider 2003), husbands tend to perform less housework. As a final 
‘couple-level’ control variable, we use information on whether only the male or only the 
female partner answered to the question on the division of housework. Consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Kamo 2000), men’s involvement in household chores is reported to 
                                                 
3 In all models, the coefficients of the ‘in the labor force’ and ‘in retirement’ variables are 
significantly different from each other (both for males and for females). While this provides some 
indication for postretirement changes in the division of household labor, these changes are 
obviously too small as to affect the basic distribution of work between men and women. 
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be stronger if the informant is a man himself, while it appears to be significantly weaker if 
only the wife’s response is available. 
The coefficient of the ‘country group’ dummy variable introduced in Model 2 
provides strong indication that beyond the micro-level determinants discussed above, 
contextual factors play an important role in shaping older couples’ division of housework. 
Households located in the northern parts of Europe (including France), i.e. in countries with 
an overall higher level of gender equality in the distribution of housework, are – 
independent of individual characteristics – significantly more likely to exhibit an equal 
sharing of household labor than their counterparts in Switzerland, Italy, Austria, Spain, and 
Greece. Model 3 shows that some of this can be attributed to cross-national differences in 
measures of gender inequality. However, unlike the proportion of women in parliament, the 
female-male wage ratio does not exhibit a statistically significant effect. Despite the 
particularly strong outcome of GEM in Model 4 (without France), though, the ‘country 
group’ dummy still remains significant, which suggests the presence of relevant 
(unobserved) context effects beyond those that can be directly attributed to macro-level 
gender inequalities. 
In the final step of our analysis, we estimate separate regressions for countries with 
lower (Model 5) and higher (Model 6) proportions of couples sharing housework equally. A 
Chi-squared test (the results of which are displayed in the last column of Table 2) provides 
only limited evidence that the effect of the micro-level determinants of housework 
distribution differs systematically between the two groups of countries. Statistically 
significant differences (at the 10-percent-level) are found for total household income, 
relative income, the number of children, and the number of living parents of the husband. 
Differences between the coefficients of ‘only male response available’ and ‘only female 
response available’ are marginally significant. However, both groups of countries differ 
significantly in the size of the full gender difference (i.e. the difference between male and 
female coefficient). 
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Specifically, we find that the hump-shaped relationship between household income 
and the gender division of housework persists in both types of countries, but that the 
location of the hump is somewhat different. In countries with a less gender equal overall 
distribution of housework (Model 5), the maximum male participation in household labor is 
at the fourth quintile, whereas the maximum in more gender equal countries (Model 6) is at 
the second quintile. Concerning relative income, it is interesting to note that men earning 
less than their female partners participate relatively more in housework tasks if they live in 
a country with a commonly less traditional division of household labor. The number of 
children and the number of the husbands’ surviving parents have a significantly negative 
effect on male housework participation only in the group of countries with a less equal 
distribution of housework. Finally, the gender-specific reporting bias (i.e. the difference 
between responses of men and women to the division of housework question) is larger in 
the less egalitarian countries. – With regard to the macro-level variables, we find 
significantly larger positive coefficients of women’s share of parliamentary seats and the 
female-male wage ratio in countries with a generally lower participation of men in 
housework. This result suggests that the effect of greater macro-level gender equality levels 
off beyond a certain threshold. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Using micro-data from the new ‘Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe’, this 
study is the first to investigate the division of household labor in older couples in a cross-
national perspective. Across continental Europe, we find considerable variation in the 
overall distribution of household labor. One may roughly distinguish between more 
egalitarian countries in northern Europe (such as Sweden and particularly Denmark) on the 
one hand, and more traditional countries in the southern parts of Europe, above all Spain 
and Greece. Since we are dealing with cohorts born 1954 or earlier, it is not surprising to 
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find a generally lower level of men’s participation in housework than might have been 
expected from studies which are representative for the whole population (e.g., Davis & 
Greenstein 2004: 1265). 
A multivariate analysis shows that the observed spatial pattern is neither due to 
differences in population composition, nor due to country-specific effects of relevant 
individual characteristics, such as education or employment status. The latter finding is 
different from Fuwa (2004), who provides evidence that relevant individual-level factors 
have weaker effects on the division of household labor for women who live in countries 
with less pronounced gender equality. The lack of support for the ‘macro-level discount 
factor’ argument in our study may result from a common baseline level of gender equality 
in our sample of ten countries, which might be too high as to allow the identification of 
effects such as those revealed in Fuwa’s analysis of 22 more diverse nations. We still find a 
significant effect of macro-level gender inequalities on couples’ division of housework (see 
also Figure 1). Even when controlling for individual characteristics of the household, 
couples living in countries with higher scores of GEM (or its elements) are more likely to 
exhibit an equal sharing of household labor. Rather than by aggregate income differentials 
between the sexes, this effect seems to be driven by the proportion of parliamentary seats 
held by women. 
Discussing the mechanisms, through which these variables may work, Batalova & 
Cohen (2002: 753) suggest that “[n]orms about the division of labor may […] be affected 
by women’s visibility in positions of public authority and prestige.” This points to the role 
of broader cultural mechanisms in shaping cross-national variations in the division of 
household labor – and indeed our analysis suggests the presence of relevant further, though 
unobserved contextual effects. Bianchi et al. (2000: 219) conclude that much of the increase 
in men’s share of housework observed in younger U.S. cohorts is due to their increased 
willingness to perform this labor, which is likely to have resulted from “changed attitudes 
about what is expected, reasonable, and fair for men to contribute to the maintenance of 
their home [… as well as from …] cultural change in ideas about ‘women’s work’. It is 
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likely more acceptable for men to cook and clean, indeed, welcomed, for men to show 
competence at making a home-cooked meal, for example.” Such inter-temporal cultural 
changes are visible as cross-cultural differences in our investigation.4 
This study has some limitations, which call for further research. First and foremost, 
the current SHARE data only allow a cross-sectional view. That is, we cannot observe 
actual changes in housework after retirement. Our rough cross-sectional evidence as well as 
previous U.S. research suggests that such changes tend to be small. However, the 
magnitude of these changes is not only likely to increase in the future (when new 
generations of more highly educated women will enter retirement), but it is also likely to 
vary across national contexts. Exploiting such inter-temporal and inter-country variations 
should be a promising field for future research. Second, compared to the International 
Social Survey Programme, for example, the sample of countries currently represented in 
SHARE is relatively small. Particularly former Socialist societies are yet missing. Future 
studies of the division of housework in older couples should not only aim at an extension of 
the spatial and time dimensions of their analyses, though. They should, third, also try – at 
the micro-level – to account for complementary productive activities of elders (inside and 
outside their own home) and – at the macro-level – to include indicators that allow to 
develop a better grasp of the cultural factors contributing to the persistence of the gendered 
division of (household) labor.5 While some suggestions in this latter regard have already 
                                                 
4 A closely related issue concerns cross-national variations in ‘equity points’. An unequal (i.e. not 
50-50) distribution of household labor need not necessarily be perceived as unfair. However, only in 
the 1990s, research began to isolate conditions associated with labeling divisions of housework as 
‘fair’ or ‘unfair’ (Coltrane 2000: 1223ff.). Recent work by Davis (2004) not only reveals cross-
national differences in women’s average perceptions of fairness of the division of household labor, 
but also shows that these are affected through a country’s political and economic history as well as 
women’s overall empowerment. 
5 This is not to say that economic factors, contributing to greater gender material equality, would be 
irrelevant (cf. Breen & Cooke 2005). 
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been put forward (such as national cohabitation rates, used by Batalova & Cohen 2002), 
much more systematic work needs still to be done. 
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Figure 1: Share of couples with egalitarian division of household labor across Europe 
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Source: SHARE 2004 (Release 1), authors’ representation.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
      Austria SwedenGermany Netherlands Spain Italy France Denmark Greece Switzerland
Ordered dependent variable           
Proportion of couples, equal divisiona           
          
       
           
           
           
           
           
          
           
           
           
           
           
           
          
           
           
          
           
           
           
           
           
          
       
           
          
           
           
0.104 0.173 0.170 0.167 0.088 0.114 0.160 0.239 0.065 0.141
Independent variables – Couple level 
Couple’s mean age 62.340 62.888 63.787 62.303 65.268 63.075 60.967 61.213 60.436 63.347
Male-female age difference 3.009 2.508 2.873 2.704 2.795 3.632 2.871 3.025 5.694 2.847
Male, high educational degreeb 0.272 0.369 0.297 0.252 0.069 0.081 0.189 0.335 0.217 0.306
Female, high educational degreeb 0.141 0.236 0.311 0.132 0.035 0.093 0.168 0.378 0.142 0.189
Household income (natural log) 10.041 10.370 10.701 10.634 9.412 9.792 10.415 10.875 9.607 10.599 
Male income < female income 0.103 0.099 0.188 0.096 0.055 0.058 0.119 0.163 0.054 0.107
Male income > female income
 
0.635 0.684 0.550 0.729 0.738 0.674 0.623 0.512 0.691 0.643
Number of children 2.099 1.941 2.517 2.431 2.709 2.152 2.397 2.342 2.080 2.238
Male in labor force 0.241 0.315 0.401 0.341 0.256 0.220 0.321 0.468 0.416 0.434
Female in labor force 0.199 0.295 0.446 0.259 0.130 0.155 0.347 0.465 0.213 0.378
Male retired from labor force 0.698 0.589 0.557 0.504 0.651 0.750 0.592 0.481 0.550 0.515
Female retired from labor force 0.468 0.429 0.464 0.147 0.135 0.373 0.358 0.422 0.242 0.393
Male limited by health problems 0.431 0.478 0.392 0.367 0.401 0.331 0.296 0.377 0.245 0.291
Female limited by health problems
 
0.426 0.503 0.427 0.476 0.487 0.387 0.326 0.404 0.249 0.342
Unmarried couple 0.040 0.047 0.080 0.039 0.075 0.016 0.037 0.078 0.012 0.046
Number of living parents, male 0.262 0.270 0.326 0.286 0.207 0.261 0.405 0.405 0.408 0.328
Number of living parents, female
 
0.349 0.410 0.399 0.411 0.311 0.350 0.559 0.510 0.629 0.487
Male helps parents 0.056 0.108 0.111 0.108 0.032 0.069 0.111 0.176 0.049 0.097
Female helps parents 0.077 0.148 0.183 0.190 0.072 0.104 0.161 0.251 0.124 0.107
Male cares for grandchildren 0.281 0.281 0.334 0.387 0.268 0.215 0.366 0.359 0.198 0.199
Female cares for grandchildren 0.337 0.330 0.411 0.442 0.349 0.306 0.429 0.400 0.228 0.224
Only male response available 0.037 0.032 0.096 0.065 0.023 0.065 0.026 0.049 0.029 0.051
Only female response available 0.049 0.030 0.103 0.078 0.023 0.049 0.045 0.065 0.044 0.015
Independent variables – Country level 
Proportion of female MPs 30.600 31.400 45.300 35.100 26.600 10.300 11.700 38 8.700 24.800
Female-male wage ratio
 
36 52 83 53 44 45 59 72 43 50
GEM 0.770 0.804 0.854 0.817 0.716 0.583 n.a. 0.847 0.523 0.771
N 427 594 623 695 347 432 380 370 591 196
a Share of couples with values equal to or larger than 3 for the ‘division of housework’ variable. b ISCED categories 4 or higher. – Source: SHARE 2004 (Release 1), authors’ 
calculations.  
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Table 2: Determinants of couples division of housework – results of ordered logit modelsa,f 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 χ2-Test 
(5)–(6) 
        
Couple’s mean age -0.019** -0.025** -0.027** -0.028** -0.030** -0.032** 0.848 
 (3.59) (4.66) (5.05) (5.09) (3.86) (4.22)  
Male-female age difference -0.018** -0.012+ -0.009 -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 0.943 
 (2.95) (1.87) (1.40) (0.50) (0.64) (0.80)  
        
Male, high educational degree 0.246** 0.178* 0.141* 0.187* 0.217+ 0.112 0.453 
 (3.53) (2.54) (1.99) (2.57) (1.82) (1.26)  
Female, high educational degree 0.313** 0.228** 0.221** 0.190* 0.173 0.255** 0.628 
 (3.96) (2.87) (2.76) (2.30) (1.18) (2.64)  
        
Household income, 1st quintileb -0.159+ -0.193* -0.197* -0.159+ 0.041 -0.380** 0.026 
 (1.79) (2.16) (2.20) (1.70) (0.29) (3.20)  
Household income, 2nd quintileb 0.086 0.062 0.058 0.103 0.058 0.055 0.986 
 (0.98) (0.71) (0.66) (1.12) (0.42) (0.47)  
Household income, 4th quintileb -0.007 0.013 0.010 0.081 0.356** -0.275* 0.000 
 (0.08) (0.15) (0.12) (0.88) (2.62) (2.39)  
Household income, 5th quintileb -0.197* -0.151+ -0.142 -0.086 0.000 -0.268* 0.141 
 (2.22) (1.69) (1.58) (0.92) (0.00) (2.27)  
        
Male income < female incomec 0.162 0.091 0.065 0.018 -0.196 0.183 0.080 
 (1.59) (0.89) (0.64) (0.17) (1.08) (1.46)  
Male income > female incomec -0.215** -0.275** -0.284** -0.292** -0.338** -0.263** 0.597 
 (3.14) (3.99) (4.12) (4.03) (3.06) (2.91)  
        
Number of children -0.083** -0.090** -0.098** -0.115** -0.195** -0.035 0.001 
 (3.80) (4.11) (4.45) (5.02) (5.50) (1.23)  
        
Male in labor forced -0.560** -0.488** -0.480** -0.493** -0.439* -0.470** 0.907 
 (4.75) (4.12) (4.03) (3.96) (2.03) (3.23)  
Female in labor forced 1.000** 0.810** 0.773** 0.721** 0.755** 0.769** 0.936 
 (12.36) (9.83) (9.27) (8.29) (5.58) (7.02)  
Male retired from labor forced -0.325** -0.161 -0.117 -0.133 0.041 -0.188 0.412 
 (2.65) (1.30) (0.94) (1.03) (0.18) (1.22)  
Female retired from labor forced 0.432** 0.342** 0.339** 0.299** 0.250* 0.451** 0.227 
 (5.73) (4.50) (4.41) (3.77) (2.15) (4.11)  
        
Male limited by health problems 0.047 0.004 -0.025 -0.032 0.027 -0.049 0.546 
 (0.80) (0.07) (0.41) (0.51) (0.28) (0.64)  
Female limited by health problems 0.274** 0.219** 0.191** 0.180** 0.287** 0.118 0.164 
 (4.75) (3.77) (3.28) (2.96) (3.06) (1.56)  
        
(continued next page) 
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Table 2 (continued): Determinants of couples division of housework – results of ordered logit 
modelsa,f 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 χ2-Test 
(5)–(6) 
        
Unmarried couple 0.567** 0.501** 0.449** 0.472** 0.615* 0.287+ 0.286 
 (4.40) (3.86) (3.45) (3.51) (2.54) (1.84)  
        
Number of living parents, male -0.099+ -0.091 -0.069 -0.078 -0.227* 0.029 0.023 
 (1.76) (1.62) (1.22) (1.31) (2.52) (0.39)  
Number of living parents, female 0.057 0.063 0.082 0.104+ 0.084 0.083 0.987 
 (1.12) (1.24) (1.61) (1.93) (1.06) (1.22)  
Male helps parents 0.357** 0.291** 0.280** 0.298** 0.394* 0.238+ 0.433 
 (3.47) (2.82) (2.71) (2.73) (2.04) (1.93)  
Female helps parents -0.109 -0.200* -0.217* -0.220* -0.067 -0.306** 0.180 
 (1.27) (2.30) (2.49) (2.39) (0.43) (2.86)  
Male cares for grandchildren 0.180* 0.116 0.118 0.161+ 0.227 0.057 0.388 
 (1.99) (1.27) (1.29) (1.68) (1.55) (0.48)  
Female cares for grandchildren -0.056 -0.129 -0.143 -0.163+ -0.122 -0.159 0.843 
 (0.64) (1.45) (1.62) (1.76) (0.88) (1.35)  
        
Only male response available 0.537** 0.466** 0.419** 0.476** 0.718** 0.267+ 0.109 
 (4.28) (3.69) (3.30) (3.68) (3.27) (1.71)  
Only female response available -0.313* -0.407** -0.433** -0.408** -0.795** -0.252 0.113 
 (2.45) (3.18) (3.37) (3.07) (3.27) (1.61)  
        
Country w/ more equal div. of labore  0.804** 0.619** 0.287**    
  (13.24) (7.38) (3.12)    
Proportion of female MPs   0.020**  0.037** 0.015** 0.002 
   (6.50)  (6.92) (3.38)  
Female-male wage ratio   -0.004  0.039** -0.005 0.000 
   (1.31)  (3.34) (1.23)  
GEM    3.449**    
    (8.41)    
        
Pseudo-R2 0.039 0.051 0.054 0.060 0.046 0.033  
N 4,391 4,391 4,391 4,037 1,877 2,514  
a Model 4 does not include France, since GEM is not available. Model 5 is estimated for CH, I, A, E, and GR. Model 6 is 
estimated for F, NL, S, D, and DK.  b Reference category: household income, 3rd quintile.  c Reference category: male 
income = female income.  d Reference category: males (females, respectively) who are neither employed, nor retired.  
e The binary variable equals 1, if the respondent lives in F, NL, S, D, or DK, 0 otherwise.  f Absolute value of z statistics 
in parentheses; + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. – Source: SHARE 2004 (Release 1), 
authors’ calculations. 
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